Abstract: This article argues for six claims about how a term is use in natural language: (1) Most terms could have designative uses and predicative uses in different contexts. A term is used *designatively* if and only if it is used to refer to an object in a world; it is used *predicatively* if and only if it is used to describe the property or status an object has in a world. (2) For proper names and natural kind terms, their designative uses are primary, and their predicative uses are parasitic to their designative uses. (3) For definite descriptions, their predicative uses are primary, and their designative uses are parasitic to their predicative uses. (4) The designative/predicative distinction is a semantic distinction, not a pragmatic one. (5) The distinction of designative and predicative uses is a new addition to contemporary philosophy of language, for it differs from other already-made distinctions, such as referential/attributive use, semantic/speaker's reference, ambiguous reference, *de dicto*/*de re* modality, wide/narrow scope, and predicativism. (6) Kripke's distinction of rigidity and non-rigidity collapses for three reasons.

Key Words: Terms, designative use, predicative use, rigidity, non-rigidity