



UNIVERSITÄT  
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# Pooling Modalities and Pointwise Intersection: a Survey of Recent Results.

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# Neighborhood Modal Logic...

The Idea...

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- Believing trivialities? ( $\Box_i \top$ ?) (or at least something)?
- Closure under weakening?

# Some Examples

	$\wedge$ -closed	non-empty	$W \in \mathcal{N}(w)$	$\vee$ -closed
Logic of Evidence	-	✓	✓	-
Strategic Powers in Games	-	✓	✓	✓
Deontic norms	-	-	-	-
<hr/>				
(Weak) belief (cf. Lottery Paradox)	-	✓	✓	✓

# Intersection Modalities

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- Logic of evidence (van Benthem&Pacuit 2011)
- Forcing Powers and Coalitions (Pauly 2002, Broersen *et al* 2007, van Benthem *et al* 2019)
- Deontic Logic: Norms from possibly different sources (Goble 2005, 2013, Klein & Marra 2019)
- Weak epistemic logics: Knowledge/Belief not closed under intersection, weakening... (Stalnaker 2006, Klein *et al* 2017)



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# The General Goal...

...Axomatize Intersection Modalities in Neighborhood Modal Logic

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## Plan

- 1 Neighborhood Modal Logic
- 2 Intersection modalities for groups
- 3 Soundness and completeness
- 4 Intersection Modalities in stronger logics
- 5 Axiomatization
- 6 Special Cases
- 7 Open ends and Future Work



# The Setting: Minimal neighborhood logic

Fix a countable set of agents  $I$ , propositional variables  $\mathfrak{P}$  and define the Language  $\mathcal{L}$

$$\varphi := p \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \neg \varphi \mid \Box_i \varphi \text{ for } p \in \mathfrak{P}, i \in I$$

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Syntactically

The **Minimal Neighborhood Logic** is defined by

- Propositional tautologies

- $$\frac{\vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi}{\vdash \Box_i \varphi \leftrightarrow \Box_i \psi} \text{ (REG)}$$

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Semantically

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**Basic Neighborhood models**

- $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, \langle \mathcal{N}_i \rangle_{i \in I}, V \rangle$
- $W$  set of worlds
- $V : \mathfrak{P} \rightarrow \wp(W)$
- $\mathcal{N}_i : W \rightarrow \wp(\wp(W))$
- $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \Box_i \varphi \Leftrightarrow \|\varphi\|^{\mathfrak{M}} \in \mathcal{N}_i(w)$

- Minimal Neighborhood Logic is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of basic neighborhood models

# The Question formally

Semantically: **Intersection neighbourhoods:**

For any *finite* set  $G = \{i_1, \dots, i_n\}$  of agents define

$$\mathcal{N}_G(w) = \{\bigcap_{1 \leq j \leq n} X_j \mid X_j \in \mathcal{N}_{i_j}(w)\}$$

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**Syntactically**

Extend the language  $\mathcal{L}$  to  $\mathcal{L}_G$ , by adding modalities  $\Box_G$  for every finite set  $G$  and define

$$M, w \models \Box_G \varphi \Leftrightarrow \|\varphi\|^w \in \mathcal{N}_G(w)$$

**Question:** What is the logic of such intersection modalities, over the class of all frames?



# Some Validities and Invalidities

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- $\Box_G \varphi \wedge \Box_H \psi \rightarrow \Box_{G \cup H} (\varphi \wedge \psi)$  For  $G, H$  disjoint (A1)

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- $\Box_G \varphi \wedge \Box_H \psi \rightarrow \Box_{GH}(\varphi \wedge \psi)$  For  $G, H$  disjoint (A1)

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- $\Box_{GH} \top \rightarrow \Box_G \top$  (A2)

## ■ Propositional tautologies

$$\blacksquare \Box_G \varphi \wedge \Box_H \psi \rightarrow \Box_{GUH}(\varphi \wedge \psi) \quad \text{For } G, H \text{ disjoint} \quad (\text{A1})$$

$$\blacksquare \Box_{GUH} \varphi \not\rightarrow \Box_G \varphi$$

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$$\blacksquare \Box_{GUH} \top \rightarrow \Box_G \top \quad (\text{A2})$$

$$\blacksquare (\Box_G \varphi \wedge \Box_{GUH} \psi) \rightarrow \Box_{GUH} \varphi \quad (\text{A3})$$

$$\blacksquare (\Box_G \varphi \wedge \Box_H(\varphi \vee \psi)) \rightarrow \Box_{GUH} \varphi \quad (\text{A4})$$

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## The Main Theorem

Minimal neighborhood logic together with the axioms (A1)-(A4) are sound and complete with respect to the class of minimal intersection frames.

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Canonical Model construction:

- 1 Start with set of MCS  $\Lambda_i$





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•  
 $\Lambda_1$

•  
 $\Lambda_2$

•  
 $\Lambda_3$

•  
 $\Lambda_4$


•  
 $\Lambda_5$

•  
 $\Lambda_6$

# The Proof Idea (In Pictures)


Canonical Model construction:

- 1 Start with set of MCS  $\Lambda_i$
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- 3 Cut puzzle pieces




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Goal:  $\Box_{\{i,j,k\}}p, \neg\Box_{\{i,j\}}p, \neg\Box_{\{i,k\}}p, \neg\Box_{\{j,k\}}p$




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
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
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
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
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
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
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


- Distribute puzzle pieces to agents:  
Agent  $i$  gets one for each  $\Box_G \varphi$  with  $i \in G, \varphi \in \mathcal{L}$
  - Show that combining **wrong** pieces can't combine create additional beliefs
- ⇒ Some Combinatorics (Chinese Remainder Theorem)



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⇒ Some Combinatorics (Chinese Remainder Theorem)

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- 2 Intersection modalities for groups ✓
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- 8 Generalizations and open ends

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How can we reason about their (hypothetical) intra-agent aggregation?

E.g.  $\Box_{i,i,i}\varphi$  could stand for: “combining three pieces of evidence of agent  $i$ , one arrives at  $\varphi$ ”

We replace groups  $G$  with multisets  $M$

$M : I \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \cup \{*\}$  (or  $M \subseteq I \times \mathbb{N}$ )

with

- (i)  $M(i) > 0$  for at most finitely many  $i \in I$
- (ii)  $M(i) > 0$  for at least one  $i \in I$

$M(i) = *$  means:

one can use an arbitrary number of neighbourhoods from  $\mathcal{N}_i(w)$

$\mathbb{M}_*; \mathbb{M}_f$

$I(M) =_{\text{df}} \{i \in I \mid M(i) \neq 0\}$ .

# Richer Languages (3)

$\mathcal{L}_*$	$\varphi := p \mid \perp \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \psi \mid \Box_M\varphi$	$p \in \mathfrak{P}$ and $M \in \mathbb{M}_*$
$\mathcal{L}_*^{\forall}$	$\varphi := p \mid \perp \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \psi \mid \Box_M\varphi \mid \forall\varphi$	$p \in \mathfrak{P}$ and $M \in \mathbb{M}_*$
$\mathcal{L}_f$	$\varphi := p \mid \perp \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \psi \mid \Box_M\varphi$	$p \in \mathfrak{P}$ and $M \in \mathbb{M}_f$
$\mathcal{L}_f^{\forall}$	$\varphi := p \mid \perp \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \psi \mid \Box_M\varphi \mid \forall\varphi$	$p \in \mathfrak{P}$ and $M \in \mathbb{M}_f$

## Definition

Let  $D$  be a set, let  $\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y} \subseteq \wp(\wp(D))$ , and let  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ .

1.  $\mathcal{X} \pitchfork \mathcal{Y} = \{X \cap Y \mid X \in \mathcal{X}, Y \in \mathcal{Y}\}$  is the pointwise intersection of  $\mathcal{X}$  and  $\mathcal{Y}$ .
2.  $\pitchfork^k \mathcal{X} = \{X_1 \cap \dots \cap X_k \mid X_1, \dots, X_k \in \mathcal{X}\}$  is the pointwise  $k$ -intersection of  $\mathcal{X}$  with itself.
3.  $\pitchfork^* \mathcal{X} = \{\bigcap \mathcal{Y} \mid \mathcal{Y} \subseteq \mathcal{X}\}$  is the pointwise arbitrary intersection of  $\mathcal{X}$  with itself.

Some facts (for  $k, l \in \mathbb{N}$ ):

1. If  $k < l$ , then  $\mathcal{X} = \mathbb{1}\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{1}^k\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{1}^l\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{1}^*\mathcal{X}$ .
2.  $(\mathbb{1}^k\mathcal{X}) \mathbb{1} (\mathbb{1}^l\mathcal{X}) = \mathbb{1}^{k+l}\mathcal{X}$
3.  $(\mathbb{1}^k\mathcal{X}) \mathbb{1} (\mathbb{1}^*\mathcal{X}) = \mathbb{1}^*\mathcal{X}$
4.  $\mathcal{X} \mathbb{1} \mathcal{Y} = \mathcal{Y} \mathbb{1} \mathcal{X}$
5.  $(\mathcal{X} \mathbb{1} \mathcal{Y}) \mathbb{1} \mathcal{Z} = \mathcal{X} \mathbb{1} (\mathcal{Y} \mathbb{1} \mathcal{Z})$

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**Remark.**  $\mathcal{X} \mathbb{1} \mathcal{Y}$  need not contain all members of  $\mathcal{X}$  or  $\mathcal{Y}$ !

## Definition

Let  $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, \langle \mathcal{N}_i \rangle_{i \in I}, V \rangle$  be a neighbourhood model and let  $M \in \mathbb{M}_*$ , with  $I(M) = \{i_1, \dots, i_n\}$ . The neighbourhood function  $\mathcal{N}_M$  is defined as follows: for every  $w \in W$ ,

$$\mathcal{N}_M(w) = (\bigcap^{M(i_1)} \mathcal{N}_{i_1}(w)) \cap \dots \cap (\bigcap^{M(i_n)} \mathcal{N}_{i_n}(w))$$



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## Definition

Where  $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, \langle \mathcal{N}_i \rangle_{i \in I}, V \rangle$  and  $w \in W$ :

4.  $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \Box_M \varphi$  iff  $\|\varphi\|^{\mathfrak{M}} \in \mathcal{N}_M(w)$
5.  $\mathfrak{M}, w \models [\forall] \varphi$  iff for all  $w' \in W$ ,  $\mathfrak{M}, w' \models \varphi$

New applications:

1 Evidence aggregation for single agents, belief-based evidence

2 resource-bounded abilities:

$$\Box_{1\cancel{x},1h}\varphi \wedge \Box_{3\cancel{x},2h}\psi \vdash \Box_{4\cancel{x},3h}(\varphi \wedge \psi)$$

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Expressive power:

- level of models: just like intersection modalities over Kripke-models, pooling modalities are strictly more expressive
- for NBH semantics: already in the single-agent case!
- frame level: i.a. closure under arbitrary intersections

# Axiomatization (1)

label	axiom/rule	$BL_*^{[\forall]}$	$BL_f^{[\forall]}$	$BL_*$	$BL_f$
(B1)	$(\Box_M \varphi \wedge \Box_N \psi) \rightarrow \Box_{M \cup N}(\varphi \wedge \psi)$	✓	✓	✓	✓
(B2)	$\Box_{M \cup N} \top \rightarrow \Box_M \top$	✓	✓	✓	✓
(B3)	$(\Box_M \varphi \wedge \Box_{M \cup N \cup N'} \varphi) \rightarrow \Box_{M \cup N} \varphi$	✓	✓	✓	✓
(B4)	$\Box_M \varphi \rightarrow \Box_{M^*} \varphi$	✓		✓	
(RE)	if $\vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$ , then $\Box_M \varphi \rightarrow \Box_M \psi$	D	D	✓	✓
(RGE)	$[\forall](\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box_M \varphi \rightarrow \Box_M \psi)$	✓	✓		
(S5)	all <b>S5</b> -axioms and rules for $[\forall]$	✓	✓		

frame condition	<b>BL</b> + axiom/rule
$\mathcal{N}_i(w) = \uparrow \mathcal{N}_i(w)$	$\Box_M \varphi \rightarrow \Box_M(\varphi \vee \psi)$
$\mathcal{N}_i(w) = \mathfrak{m}^f \mathcal{N}_i(w)$	$\Box_M \varphi \rightarrow \Box_{M_f} \varphi$
$\mathcal{N}_i(w) = \mathfrak{m}^* \mathcal{N}_i(w)$	$\Box_M \varphi \rightarrow \Box_{M_f} \varphi$
$\emptyset \notin \mathcal{N}_i(w)$	$\neg \Box_i \perp$
$\emptyset \notin \mathcal{N}_M(w)$	$\neg \Box_M \perp$
$\top \in \mathcal{N}_M(w) / \top \in \mathcal{N}_i(w)$	$\Box_M \top / \Box_i \top$
$w \in \mathcal{N}_i(w)$	$\Box_M \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$
$\mathcal{N}_i(w) = \mathcal{N}_i(w')$	$\Box_M \varphi \rightarrow [\forall] \Box_M \varphi$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$

# Axiomatization (2)

frame condition	BL + axiom/rule
$\mathcal{N}_i(w) = \uparrow \mathcal{N}_i(w)$	$\Box_M \varphi \rightarrow \Box_M(\varphi \vee \psi)$
$\mathcal{N}_i(w) = \mathfrak{m}^f \mathcal{N}_i(w)$	$\Box_M \varphi \rightarrow \Box_{M_f} \varphi$
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$\emptyset \notin \mathcal{N}_i(w)$	$\neg \Box_i \perp$
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$T \in \mathcal{N}_M(w) / T \in \mathcal{N}_i(w)$	$\Box_M T / \Box_i T$
$w \in \mathcal{N}_i(w)$	$\Box_M \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$
$\mathcal{N}_i(w) = \mathcal{N}_i(w')$	$\Box_M \varphi \rightarrow [\forall] \Box_M \varphi$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$

**Remark.** For many variants, the single-index axiom does not entail the multiset-counterpart (and hence completeness requires the multiset-counterparts).

## Theorem

*All the mentioned logics are sound and strongly complete and enjoy the finite model property.*

Proof. By playing with puzzle pieces!



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## Corollary

*All the mentioned logics are decidable.*

# Axiomatization (4)

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Labels for worlds:  $f : \mathbb{M}_* \times \mathcal{L} \rightarrow I \times \mathbb{N}$  where, for all  $(M, \varphi)$ ,  $f(M, \varphi) \in \delta(M)$

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Labels for worlds:  $f : \mathbb{M}_* \times \mathcal{L} \rightarrow I \times \mathbb{N}$  where, for all  $(M, \varphi)$ ,  $f(M, \varphi) \in \delta(M)$

Game-theoretic interpretation: if  $f(M, \varphi) = (i, k)$  then, (only) in role  $k$ , (only) player  $i$  can cut away  $\neg\varphi$ -worlds

cf. the group case: create copies, make puzzle pieces for each agent  $i \in G$  and each proposition  $\varphi$

Let  $\delta(M) = \{(i, k) \mid i \in I(M), k \leq M(i)\}$ ; the members of  $\delta(M)$  will play the role of “agents”; players & roles

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Only if some  $\delta(N)$  contains all pairs  $(i, k) \in \delta(M)$ , it can cut away all the  $\neg\varphi$ -worlds, thus obtaining  $\|\varphi\|$

For every  $i \in I$ ,

$$\mathcal{N}_i(\Lambda, f) = \{X_{i,k}^{M,\varphi} \mid \Box_M \varphi \in \Lambda, (i, k) \in \delta^\ominus(M)\}$$

where, for all  $(M, \varphi) \in \mathcal{D}_\ominus$  and  $(i, k) \in \delta^\ominus(M)$ ,

$$X_{i,k}^{M,\varphi} = \{(\Lambda, f) \in W \mid \varphi \in \Lambda \text{ or } f(M, \varphi) \neq (i, k)\}$$

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Finite model property: reduce the domain and range of the  $f$ 's, i.v.o. the formula to be falsified...



Recall:

- 1 Kripke-semantics is a special case of NBH semantics: augmented models (cf. infra)
- 2 intersection modalities in Kripke-semantics:

$$\mathfrak{M}, w \models \Box_G \varphi \text{ iff } \bigcap_{i \in G} R_i(w) \subseteq \|\varphi\|^{\mathfrak{M}}$$

(study of distributed belief, distributed knowledge, etc.)

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How do intersection modalities and intersections of relations relate to pooling modalities and pointwise intersection?

# Special Cases (1)

## Definition

$\mathcal{X} \subseteq \wp(D)$  is augmented iff

(i)  $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{X}^\uparrow$

(ii)  $D \in \mathcal{X}$

(iii)  $\mathcal{X} = \mathfrak{M}^* \mathcal{X}$

$\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, \langle \mathcal{N}_i \rangle_{i \in I}, V \rangle$  is augmented iff for all  $w \in W$  and all  $i \in I$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_i(w)$  is augmented.

## Lemma

For augmented NBH models,  $\Box_M \varphi$  and  $\Box_{I(M)} \varphi$  are equivalent.

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## Lemma

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## Standard transformation:

- $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{N}}(w) = \bigcap \mathcal{N}(w)$
- $\mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{R}}(w) = \{X \subseteq W \mid \mathcal{R}(w) \subseteq X\}$ .

## Theorem

*Every augmented NBH model can be transformed into an  $\mathcal{L}_G^{\mathcal{M}}$ -equivalent relational model (using the standard transformation), and vice versa.*

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*Every augmented NBH model can be transformed into an  $\mathfrak{L}_G^{\mathbb{M}}$ -equivalent relational model (using the standard transformation), and vice versa.*

## Corollary

*For all  $\varphi \in \mathfrak{L}_G^{\mathbb{M}}$ ,  $\varphi$  is valid on the class of all relational models iff  $\varphi$  is valid on the class of all augmented neighbourhood models.*

Where  $G \in \mathbb{G}$ , let  $G^* = \{(i, *) \mid i \in G\} \cup \{(i, 0) \mid i \notin G\}$ .

Define  $tr : \mathfrak{L}_G^{\mathbb{M}} \rightarrow \mathfrak{L}_{*}^{\mathbb{M}}$  as follows:

$$tr(\varphi) = \varphi \text{ for all } \varphi \in \mathfrak{P}$$

$$tr(\neg\varphi) = \neg tr(\varphi)$$

$$tr(\varphi \vee \psi) = tr(\varphi) \vee tr(\psi)$$

$$tr([\forall]\varphi) = [\forall]tr(\varphi)$$

$$tr(\Box_G\varphi) = \bigvee_{\emptyset \subset H \subseteq G} \Box_{H^*} tr(\varphi) \vee [\forall]tr(\varphi)$$

## Theorem

*For all  $\varphi \in \mathfrak{L}_G^{\mathbb{M}}$ ,  $\varphi$  is valid on the class of all relational models iff  $tr(\varphi)$  is valid on the class of all monotonic models.*

# Special Cases (4)

Monotonic models  $\Leftrightarrow$  inexact semantic clause

## Definition

Let  $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, \langle \mathcal{N}_i \rangle_{i \in I}, V \rangle$  be a model and  $w \in W$ . Then

$\mathfrak{M}, w \vDash_i \Box_M \varphi$  iff there is an  $X \in \mathcal{N}_M(w)$  such that  $X \subseteq \|\varphi\|^{\mathfrak{M}}$ .

## Lemma

Let  $\mathbb{X} \subseteq \wp(\wp(\wp(D)))$  for some non-empty domain  $D$ . Then

$\bigcap \{ \mathcal{X}^\uparrow \mid \mathcal{X} \in \mathbb{X} \} = (\bigcap \mathbb{X})^\uparrow$ .

## Corollary

For all models  $\mathfrak{M}$ :  $\mathfrak{M}, w \vDash_i \varphi$  iff  $\mathfrak{M}^\uparrow, w \vDash \varphi$ .

## Corollary

$\varphi$  is valid using the inexact semantic clause iff  $\varphi$  is valid on the class of monotonic models.



- pointwise boolean operations, e.g.  $\Box_{(\alpha \sqcup \beta) \sqcap (\neg \gamma)} \varphi$ ; relation to truthmaker semantics
- non-empty intersections for the inexact semantic clause?
- other frame conditions: positive & negative introspection, . . .
- beliefs based on (co-compatible) distributed evidence
- shared vs. distributed information over NBH models
- alternative proof via quasi-models?
- conditional modal logics?
-

Thank you!

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