**日本哲学会会长饭田隆教授的两次讲演**

Takashi Iida（饭田隆），日本大学哲学教授、日本哲学会会长，研究领域为分析哲学，专长为语言哲学和维特根斯坦研究。Iida教授应邀在本系做两次讲演：

第一次：

题目：Mass/count distinction in a classifier language

摘要：The recent development of plural logic has been a good news for a student of the semantics of a language like Japanese which has no systematic distinction between singular and plural. But plural logic is applicable only to countable predicates; it is not applicable to non-countable predicates. Thus, the first question that must be settled before we may apply plural logic to Japanese is to make sure that it has countable predicates.

I argue that Japanese has indeed countable predicates and that they can be recognized by a kind of numeral suffixes which can modify them. Japanese numeral suffixes are divided into three classes, namely, (1) sortal suffixes, or classifiers, (2) unit-forming suffixes, and (3) measure suffixes; they can be distinguished from each other by a certain simple test. I argue that a sortal suffix's contribution to the meaning of a sentence in which it occurs is not to its truth-conditional content but to its conventional implicature only, and hence that a noun which typically occurs with a sortal suffix has an individuating force by itself.

On the basis of the above, we can single out a class of count nouns. The resulting distinction between count nouns and non-count nouns largely coincides with the count/mass distinction, and we argue that, in contrast to what is commonly thought, this distinction is more robust in a classifier language like Japanese than in a number-sensitive language like English.

时间：2015年9月15日下午3：10-6:00

地点：三教506

主持人：陈波教授

第二次：

题目：Towards an ontology of the rainbow

摘要：There are some objects of perception that are either too far from us to touch or that cannot be touched at all. Typical examples are the sky and the various phenomena that appear in the sky such as rainbows and sunsets.

My talk is concerned with the ontological status of the rainbow. Does it exist when it is not actually perceived? Does it exist even when it is not possibly perceived? My conclusion is that a rainbow is a physical event, and that, although it is recognized as a rainbow by its characteristic visual appearance, it should not be identified with that appearance. I suggest that the case of the rainbow might give us useful hints for the analysis of secondary qualities like colors and sounds.

时间：2015年9月16下午3：00-5:00

地点：人文学苑哲学系3109

主持人：陈波教授

饭田隆教授的简介见附件。