时间：10月10日下午3点到6点

地点：理教417教室

主讲人：Prof.Matthias Schirn

题目：Second-Order Abstraction before and After Russells Paradox

Abstract   In this talk, I analyze several aspects of Frege’s paradigms of second-order abstraction: Hume’s Principle and Axiom V. The issues dealt with include self-evidence and epistemic value with special emphasis on Axiom V, Frege’s attitude towards Axiom V before and after Russell’s discovery of the contradiction, as well as the possible role and the status of Hume’s Principle in the wake of Russell’s Paradox. In the central part, I pursue a twofold aim: (a) to shed new light on the connection between Frege’s way of introducing the primitive function-names of his logical system and the requisite self-evidence of his axioms in whose expression such a function-name occurs; and (b) to examine the conflict between the requirements of self-evidence and real epistemic value arising inevitably and invariably from Fregean abstraction principles, if they are singled out as axioms of a theory T.

Matthias Schirn 教授是德国慕尼黑大学哲学系教授，研究领域为： Philosophy and history of logic; philosophy of mathematics; proof theory; philosophy of language and intensional semantics; epistemology; the philosophies of Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant, Frege, Hilbert, Russell and Wittgenstein